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NOTES
INDIGENTS HAVE NO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO
APPOINTED COUNSEL IN PROCEEDINGS
TO TERMINATE PARENTAL RIGHTS-
LASSITER V. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
An indigent's right to counsel is guaranteed by both the sixth' and four-
teenth amendments 2 to the United States Constitution. Although the sixth
amendment is expressly limited to criminal prosecutions, the fourteenth
amendment guarantee of due process applies equally to civil and criminal
proceedings.'
The goal of the fourteenth amendment due process clause is to protect
against arbitrary state intervention in the lives of its citizens.' Specifically,
the due process clause requires that certain procedural protections be guar-
ranteed when the government deprives an individual of his fundamental
1. The sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to ... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The
sixth amendment right to counsel was applied to the states through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See generally W.
BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS (1955). (seminal work that traces the
right to counsel from early English common law to American law in the 1950's) [hereinafter
cited as BEANEY].
2. The fourteenth amendment provides: "No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. The Supreme Court, in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), first
declared that the assistance of counsel was so "vital and imperative" that failure to appoint
counsel was a denial of due process. Id. at 71. Although the Court has not defined "due pro-
cess" in precise terms, it has described its significance as embodying "certain immutable prin-
ciples of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government . . . as that no man shall be
condemned in his person without due notice and an opportunity [to be] heard." Holden v.
Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1898). The Powell Court stated that failure to appoint counsel
constituted a denial of due process because "the right to be heard would be, in many cases, of
little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel." 287 U.S. at 69.
3. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In Gault, the Supreme Court relied on the fourteenth
amendment to hold that due process requires appointed counsel for indigent children facing
juvenile delinquency proceedings even though such hearings are designated civil rather than
criminal. See also Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1950)
(both fifth and fourteenth amendment due process clauses require at least notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard in civil cases).
4. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). In the Slaughter House
Cases, the Court construed the fourteenth amendment due process clause as a restraint upon
the power of the states, analogous to the fifth amendment restraint upon the federal govern-
ment. Accord, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). See also BEANEY, supra note 1, at 32.
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right to life, liberty, or property.5 Once an asserted right is found to require
specific procedural protections, every individual invoking that right is ac-
corded those same protections.' Courts have traditionally resolved the ques-
tion of what procedures are required by balancing private interests against
governmental interests.'
Recently, however, in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,' the
Supreme Court departed from traditional interest balancing and found that
due process protection only guarantees the appointment of counsel when
the private interest is physical liberty.9 According to the Lassiter Court,
when the interest at stake is not physical liberty, the decision whether due
process requires the appointment of counsel must be made on a case-by-
case basis.'"
Close examination of the Lassiter decision reveals that the Supreme
Court's departure from traditional due process interest balancing was based
upon a misinterpretation of precedent. Contrary to the Court's assertion in
Lassiter, precedent does not support a presumption that physical liberty is
the only interest warranting a right to counsel. A more accurate reading of
precedent would have guided the Court to a result consistent with tradi-
tional due process analysis. Specifically, previous right to counsel cases have
established that due process requires the appointment of counsel when the
state seeks to deprive an indigent of a fundamental right through an adver-
sary proceeding. Additionally, a comparison with the ad hoc decision-
making formerly practiced by courts considering the right to counsel sug-
gests the possible impact of the Lassiter analysis.
5. There have been many cases delineating the process due in various factual contexts.
See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (due process requires hearing on issue of fault or
liability prior to suspension of driver's license); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971)
(violates due process to deny indigents seeking divorce access to courts because of their inabil-
ity to pay court costs and fees).
6. E.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S 564 (1972) (that nontenured professor's in-
terests in re-employment were of major concern to him is irrelevant in due process analysis that
looks to nature, not weight, of interest); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (deprivation of
stereo equipment through prejudgment replevin violates due process because debtor's interest
in uninterrupted use constitutes a property interest within meaning of fourteenth amendment
irrespective of weight of interest). Due process protects the "interest," not merely the in-
dividual litigant, the degree of whose interest may vary from case to case. See Green, The Bill
of Rights, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court, 46 MICH. L. REV. 869, 907
(1948) [hereinafter cited as Green].
7. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parolee's liberty interest requires
informal parole revocation hearing since the state has no interest in revoking parole without a
hearing); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (individual's substantial interest in welfare
benefits outweighs state's interest in summary adjudication and requires increased procedural
safeguards). For a discussion of interest balancing as it is used to define public policy rather
than merely to check government power over the individual, see Note, Specifying the Pro-
cedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 1510 (1975).
8. 101 S. Ct. 2153 (1981).
9. Id at 2158-59. See notes 74-75 infra.
10. 101 S. Ct. at 2162. See note 84 and accompanying text infra.
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BACKGROUND
The Right to Counsel Cases
The sixth amendment provides that all criminal defendants shall "enjoy
the right" to the assistance of counsel." Although originally interpreted to
grant only the right to retained counsel,' 2 the Supreme Court eventually
recognized that the sixth amendment guarantees the assistance of
government-appointed counsel for indigents in federal criminal
proceedings. 3
The sixth amendment, however, is not the only constitutional source for
the right to appointed counsel. In Powell v. Alabama,' the Supreme Court
held that the fourteenth amendment guaranteed appointed counsel for in-
digent defendants charged with capital offenses in state court proceedings.
Powell involved seven illiterate black youths who were sentenced to death
for raping two white women.'" The Powell Court declared that the necessity
of counsel was imperative in a trial for a capital offense and that the failure
of the trial court to appoint counsel was a denial of due process under the
fourteenth amendment."
Ten years later, however, the Court refused to extend the holding in
Powell to require appointment of counsel for indigents in noncapital state
cases. In Betts v. Brady," the Court reasoned that the right to court-
11. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See note I supra. Prior to 1836, English law denied felons and
those charged with treason the right to be represented by counsel. BEANEY, supra note 1, at
27-30. Curiously, in England, it was only civil litigants who were permitted to retain counsel, or
who were appointed counsel if indigent. See Cohen, The Origins of the English Bar (pts. 1 &
2), 30 L.Q. REV. 464 (1914), 31 L.Q. REV. 56 (1915). Although the intent of the authors of the
sixth amendment is not completely certain, some commentators maintain that the amendment
was primarily a rejection of the English rule. See Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36
HARV. L. REV. 361, 381 (1923). Therefore, some authors contend that the sixth amendment
does not represent a denial of a right to counsel in civil litigation. See, e.g., Note, The Right to
Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1322, 1327 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Right to Counsel].
12. BEANEY, supra note 1, at 32.
13. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1939) (unless waived, sixth amendment right to
counsel bars government from depriving uncounselled indigents of life or liberty in federal
criminal proceedings).
14. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
15. Powell was the case of the famous "Scottsboro boys." Community tensions were high
and the trial was rushed without giving the defendants an opportunity to employ counsel.
Although the trial court appointed "all members of the bar" to represent the defendants, it
was "little more than an expansive gesture, imposing no substantial or definite obligations
upon anyone." Id. at 56.
16. The Supreme Court reasoned that the ignorance and illiteracy of the defendants, as
well as the seriousness of the crime, rendered the lack of appointed counsel a denial of due
process within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 71.
17. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). Betts' request for counsel was denied by the trial court. At trial,
Betts cross-examined the prosecution's witnesses and called his own witnesses. He was con-
victed of burglary and sentenced to eight years in prison. For an exceptional literary treatment
of Betts, see A. LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 109-18 (1964) [hereinafter cited as LEWIS].
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appointed counsel was not a fundamental right essential to a fair trial. 8 Ac-
cordingly, the Court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment did not require the appointment of counsel in every case.' 9 The
Betts Court mandated a case-by-case determination of the right to ap-
pointed counsel, based upon the "special circumstances" rule.2" Under this
rule, due process requires counsel to be appointed only when the totality of
circumstances in a particular case demonstrates that there has been "a
denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of
justice." 2 ' Thus, the Betts Court held that the state court's refusal to ap-
point counsel to represent the petitioner at his trial for burglary was not a
violation of due process because the issues presented were simple and the
petitioner was mature and intelligent.22
From soon after its inception, the "special circumstances" rule was in
gradual demise due to difficulties in application.2" Although the Supreme
Court propounded specific criteria for a finding of special circumstances, "
18. The Betts Court stated that lack of counsel could result in some convictions that were
fundamentally unfair, but maintained that the sixth amendment did not compel the conclusion
that no trial for any offense could be conducted fairly without counsel. 316 U.S. at 473.
19. Id. at 471.
20. The Betts rule became known as the "special circumstances rule" after the Court so
described it in Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951) (young, irresponsible boy who had spent
years in mental institutions desperately needed counsel at trial for armed robbery).
21. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. at 462. In Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948),
Justice Reed summarized the Court's approach as follows:
Where the gravity of the crime and other factors-such as the age and education
of the defendant, the conduct of the court or the prosecuting officials, and the
complicated nature of the offense charged and the possible defenses thereto-
render criminal proceedings without counsel so apt to result in injustice as to be
fundamentally unfair, [we] hold that the accused must have legal assistance under
the amendment.
Id. at 440-41 (footnotes omitted).
22. 316 U.S. at 472.
23. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Justice Harlan, in his concurrence,
stated: "In noncapital cases, the 'special circumstances' rule has continued to exist in form
while its substance has been substantially and steadily eroded . . . .The Court has come to rec-
cognize . . . that the mere existence of a serious criminal charge constituted in itself special cir-
cumstances requiring the services of counsel at trial." Id. at 350-51 (Harlan, J., concurring).
See also Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (absence of counsel at arraignment violated
petitioner's due process rights under the fourteenth amendment).
24. The following factors were deemed relevant in determining whether the proceeding was
fundamentally fair under the "special circumstances" rule: (1) the complexity of the statute and
nature of offense, e.g., Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962); Chewning v. Cunningham,
368 U.S. 443 (1962); Reynolds v. Cochran, 365 U.S. 525 (1961); Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman
v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956); (2) that certain arguments or objections could have been, but
were not, made, e.g., Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 U.S. 697 (1960); Gibbs v. Burke, 337
U.S. 773 (1949); (3) lack of education or illiteracy, e.g., McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109
(1961); Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S. 633 (1959); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957); Reece v.
Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955); (4) mental illness or retardation, e.g., Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S.
105 (1954); Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951); (5) youth of defendant, e.g., Uveges v. Penn-
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the rule was applied inconsistently.2" Generally, state courts refused to find
that special circumstances existed;26 whereas, the Supreme Court found
special circumstances in nine out of the fourteen cases it decided involving
the issue.27 When the Supreme Court finally reconsidered the indigent's
sylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948); DeMeerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947); (6) a plea of guilty
by codefendant, e.g., Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 U.S. 697 (1960); Cash v. Culver, 358
U.S. 633 (1959); (7) extent of accused's previous experience with criminal proceedings, e.g.,
Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 660 (1950); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948); (8) adequacy
of assistance by judge, Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949); (9) misconduct by judge or prose-
cutor, Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948); and (10) severity of the sentence, Uveges v.
Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948).
25. The Supreme Court's decisions applying the Betts "special circumstances" rule were at
times inconsistent. Compare DeMeerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947) (court found age to
be a critical factor when 17 year old was charged, tried, convicted, and sentenced to life im-
prisonment for murder all in one day) and Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948) (court
found youth of 17 years old convicted of burglaries to be important factor in denial of due
process) with Gayes v. New York, 332 U.S. 145 (1947) (16 year old convicted of petty larceny
without assistance of counsel not denied due process) and Canizio v. New York, 327 U.S. 82
(1946) (19 year old petitioner who pled guilty without the aid of counsel was not deprived of
due process).
State court application of the "special circumstances" rule was similarly uneven. See, e.g.,
Asbey v. State, 102 So. 2d 407 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) ("ignorant Negro" denied due pro-
cess of law when not represented by counsel); Shaffer v. Warden of Md. House of Corrections,
126 A.2d 573 (Md. 1956) (19 year old mental defective suffering from a speech defect not
deprived of due process when denied appointed counsel); People v. Coates, 81 N.W.2d 411
(Mich. 1957) (feeble-minded defendant sentenced to life imprisonment without assistance of
counsel denied due process). Moreover, while the Supreme Court expanded the meaning of
"special circumstances," state courts continued to narrowly define the rule. In Chewning v.
Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962), the United States Supreme Court held that the complex
legal issue presented in that case necessitated the appointment of counsel. In contrast, less than
a year before, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had found no special circumstances when an
illiterate 18 year old, with the mental capacity of a nine year old, was convicted of rape and
robbery and sentenced to 20 to 40 years in prison without the aid of counsel. Commonwealth
ex rel. Simon v. Maroney, 405 Pa. 562, 176 A.2d 94 (1961).
26. Out of 139 cases heard by state courts on the issue, only 11 recognized the existence of
special circumstances. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union and the Florida Civil Liber-
ties Union, Amici Curiae at 19, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), reprinted in 57
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw 463, 488 (P. Kurland ed. 1975). E.g., Truelove v. Warden of Md. House of Cor-
rections, 115 A.2d 297 (Md. 1955); People v. Whitsitt, 359 Mich. 656, 103 N.W.2d 424 (1960);
State v. Simpson, 243 N.C. 436, 90 S.E.2d 708 (1956).
27. See, e.g., McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109 (1961) (black man who was incapable of his
own defense because of ignorance and mental illness entitled to counsel); Hudson v. North
Carolina, 363 U.S. 697 (1960) (18 year old defendant required assistance of counsel due to pre-
judicial position he was put in by his codefendants' guilty plea); Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S. 633
(1959) (uneducated 20 year old with no previous trial experience had a right to counsel); Giggs
v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949) (lack of counsel handicapped defendant to the extent that he
was denied due process); Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945) (Indian who committed crime on
reservation and was not advised of his right to counsel denied due process); Williams v. Kaiser,
323 U.S. 471 (1945) (defendant incapable of preparing his own defense). After 1950, the
Supreme Court consistently found special circumstances in sixth amendment cases. Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 351 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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right to court-appointed counsel in Gideon v. Wainwright,28 the Betts deci-
sion was expressly overruled.29
The facts in Gideon were substantially similar to those in Betts. Gideon
was charged with a felony and denied appointed counsel by the trial court."
He was convicted and sentenced to serve five years in prison. 3' On appeal,
the Supreme Court held that an indigent's right to appointed counsel was a
fundamental right essential to a fair trial, regardless of the specific cir-
cumstances of a particular case,32 and thus protected against state interven-
tion by the fourteenth amendment.33
The Gideon decision, however, failed to clearly define the extent of an in-
digent's right to appointed counsel. This uncertainty has resulted in incon-
sistent application of the Gideon rationale. For example, because the peti-
tioner in Gideon was charged with a felony, some courts have concluded
that appointed counsel is required only for indigent felons.3 ' Other courts
have maintained that the right extends to indigent defendants in all criminal
proceedings.35 A middle position taken by other courts was that counsel is
guaranteed for indigents accused of crimes for which the punishment was
"serious." 36 Because of this rampant confusion in the lower courts, the
scope of an indigent's right to counsel depended upon the jurisdiction of his
trial.37
28. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In the order granting certiorari, Gideon v. Cochran, 370 U.S. 908
(1962), the Court requested that both sides discuss in their briefs and oral arguments whether
Betts v. Brady should be reconsidered. Se LEWIS, supra note 17, at 43.
29. For a discussion of the significance of Justice Black's authorship of Gideon, see Israel,
Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 Sup. Cr. REv. 211, 231-42. According to
Professor Israel, Justice Black's belief that the sixth amendment, along with the entire Bill of
Rights, was incorporated into the fourteenth amendment precluded him from according any
validity to Betts v. Brady. Consequently, Justice Black was forced to reject traditional Supreme
Court methods of overruling in favor of an approach characterizing Betts as "an abrupt break
with precedent". 372 U.S. at 344. See note 32 infra.
30. More specifically, Gideon was charged with the felony of breaking and entering with
intent to commit a misdemeanor.
31. The Supreme Court of Florida denied Gideon's application for a writ of habeas corpus.
Gideon v. Cochran, 135 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 1961).
32. The Gideon Court stated that Betts had been an "abrupt break" with precedent,
discussing in particular Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (right to counsel is among fun-
damental rights safeguarded against state action by the fourteenth amendment); and Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (counsel necessary to protect fundamental rights of liberty and
life). 372 U.S. at 343-44. Additionally, the Court asserted that reason and reflection required
recognition of the right to counsel as fundamental and essential to a fair trial. That the govern-
ment hires prosecutors and that defendants who can afford to retain lawyers, illustrates the
widespread belief that the assistance of counsel is a necessity. Id.
33. Id. at 342.
34. E.g., Cortinez v. Flourney, 249 La. 741, 190 So. 2d 909 (1966); City of Toledo v.
Frazier, 10 Ohio App. 2d 51, 226 N.E.2d 777 (1967).
35. E.g., People v. Letterio, 16 N.Y.2d 303, 213 N.E.2d 670, 266 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1965); City
of Tacoma v. Healer, 67 Wash. 2d 736, 409 P.2d 869 (1966).
36. E.g., Irvin v. State, 44 Ala. App. 101, 203 So. 2d 283 (1967); State v. Anderson, 96
Ariz. 123, 392 P.2d 784 (1964).
37. For a discussion of the impact of Gideon on the individual states as of 1970, see Com-
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In 1972, the Supreme Court attempted to resolve the confusion in the
state courts. In Argersinger v. Hamlin,3" the Court concluded that the ra-
tionales of Gideon and Powell regarding the necessity of counsel to a fair
trial was relevant to criminal proceedings when physical liberty was at
stake.39 Consequently, the right to appointed counsel was not dependent
upon the classification of the offense as a felony or misdemeanor, but upon
whether the defendant was likely to be incarcerated as a result of his trial.
Imprisonment, the Argersinger Court recognized, was the most important
consideration because it could jeopardize the defendant's career, reputation,
health, and general well-being. 4 0
Similarly, the classification of the offense was found to be nondeter-
minative of the right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants in In re
Gault."' In Gault, the Supreme Court held that due process required the ap-
pointment of counsel for juveniles in delinquency hearings, even though such
ment, Right to Counsel: The Impact of Gideon v. Wainwright in the Fifty States, 3 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 103 (1970).
38. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). In Argersinger, the uncounselled petitioner was convicted by a
Florida court of carrying a concealed weapon, an offense punishable by up to six months in
jail and a $1000 fine. After being sentenced to pay $500 or spend 90 days in jail, the petitioner
sought habeas corpus. The Florida Supreme Court held that the right to counsel extends to of-
fenses punishable by more than six months imprisonment, but dismissed Argersinger's writ
because his offense was just under the line. State ex rel. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 236 So. 2d 442
(Fla. 1970). See Duke, The Right to Appointed Counsel: Argersinger and Beyond, 12 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 601 (1975).
39. 407 U.S. at 33. The Argersinger Court stated:
The requirement of counsel may well be necessary for a fair trial even in a petty-
offense prosecution. We are by no means convinced that legal and constitutional
questions involved in a case that actually leads to imprisonment even for a brief
period are any less complex than when a person can be sent off for six months or
more.
Id. (citations omitted).
40. Id. at 37 (citing Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970)). The Argersinger Court
expressly left open the question of whether counsel was required for a defendant charged with
a crime for which imprisonment was authorized but not imposed. Subsequently, in Scott v. Il-
linois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), the Court, in a plurality opinion, concluded that Argersinger had
limited the constitutional right to counsel in state court proceedings to those cases in which
physical liberty is at stake. Id. at 373. Scott, however, was based less on the underpinnings of
Argersinger than it was on the plurality's fear of further extending the right to counsel. Noting
that previous cases had departed from the literal meaning of the sixth amendment, the Scott
Court warned that "constitutional line-drawing becomes more difficult as the reach of the
Constitution is extended further." Id. at 372. The plurality opinion also expressed reluctance
to extend the right to counsel for fear of political confusion and increased costs to the states.
Id. at 373. The economic justification is clearly incompatible with previous decisions holding
that state fiscal interests do not justify denying the constitutional rights of indigents. See, e.g.,
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971). See also Note,
Scott v. Illinois: Holding the Line on the Indigent Misdemeanant's Right to Counsel, 9 CAP.
U.L. REV. 149 (1979) (Supreme Court's failure to extend right to appointed counsel to crimes
for which incarceration is authorized is contrary to precedent and will result in problems for
lower courts).
41. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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hearings were considered civil."2 The Gault Court refused to rely on the
civil/criminal distinction and concluded that the assistance of appointed
counsel was essential to a fair trial in cases that may result in incarceration."3
The Gault decision was a particularly significant step in the evolution of
the indigent's right to counsel because it was based solely on general four-
teenth amendment principles of procedural fairness, not on the explicit sixth
amendment guarantee."' Gault, in effect, established a right to appointed
counsel based exclusively on the fourteenth amendment's due process
guarantee of a fair hearing." As a result: the right to appointed counsel for
indigent defendants in civil proceedings became a due process question.
The Due Process Analysis
Fourteenth amendment due process analysis typically requires the resolu-
tion of two issues. First, a court must determine whether an interest exists
that gives rise to procedural protection." Second, a court must establish
what specific procedures are required to protect the interest in question. 4'
To determine whether a sufficient interest exists, a court must decide
whether the government seeks to deprive the individual of life,' 8 liberty,' 9 or
property 0 within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. In one case,
for example, the Supreme Court held that a nontenured university professor
had no fourteenth amendment property interest in continued employment,
and therefore, no procedural protection was due.3 ' In another case, the
42. Id. at 35-37. Gault dealt specifically with the Arizona Juvenile Code which left the ap-
pointment of counsel to the discretion of the court. The Supreme Court recognized that a child
could be incarcerated "for anything from waywardness to rape and homicide." Id. at 27.
43. Id. at 41. The Court stated that to find that juvenile behavior was not criminal and
therefore unprotected by the Constitution "would be to disregard substance because of the feeble
enticement of the 'civil' label-of-convenience which has been attached to juvenile proceedings."
Id. at 49-50.
44. The Court described the right to counsel as deriving from the right to "essentials of
due process and fair treatment." Id. at 30 (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562
(1966)).
45. See Comment, The Indigent Parent's Right to Appointed Counsel in Actions to Ter-
minate Parental Rights, 43 U. CIN. L. REV. 635, 639 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Comment];
Recent Developments, Constitutional Law-Due Process-Indigent Parents' Right to Counsel
in Child Neglect Cases, 46 TENN. L. REV. 649 (1979).
46. See generally Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property", 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405
(1977) (examination of Court's varying definitions of the liberty and property protected by due
process); Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV.
431 (1926) (discussion of expanding interpretation given language of due process clause, most
specifically the world "liberty").
47. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (due process requires notice,
disclosure of evidence, confrontation of witnesses, neutral and detached hearing body and written
decision for parole revocation).
48. E.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). See note 15 and accompanying text
supra.
49. E.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
50. E.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
51. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972).
[Vol. 31:153
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Court found that the physical liberty of a parolee, although conditional,
constituted an interest within the scope of the liberty protected by the four-
teenth amentment1 2 When the Court finds that a fourteenth amendment in-
terest necessitates procedural protection, the issue of the requisite proce-
dural safeguards must be resolved."
In Mathews v. Eldridge,5" the Court propounded three elements to be
balanced in determining the necessary due process safeguards. At the out-
set, a court should look to the weight of the private interest to determine
the degree of protection to which the individual is entitled." Next, the court
should evaluate the governmental interests advanced to justify limited pro-
cedural protections. 6 For example, in Goldberg v. Kelly" when a welfare
recipient challenged the sufficiency of the procedures provided by the state
prior to the termination of benefits, the Court first evaluated the private in-
terests involved. The Court then balanced the state's interest in protecting
public funds by avoiding the additional expense of increased procedural
protections against the private need to receive welfare benefits. The Court
found that the private interest outweighed the state's interest, and held that
due process required increased procedural protections. 8 Finally, under
Mathews, the court should examine the risk of error if the procedures are
not employed."
The Supreme Court has consistently utilized the Mathews balancing pro-
cess to resolve fourteenth amendment procedural questions. Recently, in
52. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
53. Under a due process claim, litigants may pursue any of the usual components of a trial-
type proceeding. See generally Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1956) (analysis of types of hearings and the necessary accompanying procedures).
54. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The Mathews Court concluded that due process does not require
an evidentiary hearing prior to termination of social security benefits.
55. Id. at 335. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
56. 424 U.S. at 347-48. Generally, the government will have an interest in either minimizing
its administrative burdens, or safeguarding certain substantive objectives. If the latter interest
is asserted, the Court weighs the importance of the state's objective. Next, the Court discounts
or enhances this objective in relation to the effect the requested procedures would have on the
government's ability to attain its objective. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)
(state's objective of keeping order in public school important, but not diminished by requiring
hearing prior to suspending students for misconduct).
57. 397 U.S. 254, 260-71 (1970).
58. Id. at 265-66.
59. The determination of the risk of error is sometimes omitted. E.g., Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471 (1972).
To determine whether accurate fact finding is possible without the proposed procedures, the
court should consider factors such as the nature of the issues presented, e.g., Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 609-10 (1974) (because legal issues are not complicated at prejudg-
ment sequestration proceedings, due process allows initial seizure on sworn ex parte docu-
ments, followed by an early opportunity to put creditor to his proof); the litigants' ability to
protect themselves, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787-91 (1973) (appointed counsel is
necessary only when especially needed in probation revocation hearing); and, the veracity of
the witnesses, e.g., Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971) (due process does not entitle
social security disability claimant to cross-examine doctors testifying as to the nature of disa-
bility in part because of the doctor's unquestionable credibility).
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Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,"0 the Court applied the Mathews
formula to determine the right to court-appointed counsel in proceedings to
terminate parental rights. The Lassiter Court, however, introduced a new
element into the balancing process: the presumption that the right to ap-
pointed counsel is guaranteed only when the private interest is physical
liberty.6
THE LASSITER DECISION
Abby Gail Lassiter, the mother of five children, lost custody of her
youngest son, William, following a court determination that he was being
neglected. 2 Subsequently, Lassiter began serving an unrelated twenty to
forty-five year sentence for second-degree murder. 3 While in prison,
Lassiter was informed that the County Department of Social Services plan-
ned to terminate her parental rights with respect to William. She did not,
however, arrange for counsel to assist her at the termination hearing.6"
At the outset of the proceeding, the North Carolina State District Court
found that Lassiter had ample opportunity to seek representation, and
refused to postpone the hearing based on her lack of counsel.65 The judge
explained to Lassiter that she could question the witnesses, but instead, she
attempted to argue her position. Consequently, the judge continually disal-
lowed her statements.6 Finding that Lassiter had failed "to maintain con-
60. 101 S. Ct. 2153 (1981).
61. See notes 72-75 and accompanying text infra.
62. In re Lassiter, 43 N.C. App. 525, 259 S.E.2d 336 (1979). The neglect charges stemmed
from an incident in which a county social worker took the child from his home to a hospital
where doctors advised that the child stay for two weeks "because of breathing difficulties, mal-
nutrition, and [because] there was a great deal of scarring that indicated that he had a severe
infection that had gone untreated." Trial Transcript at 11, In re Lassiter, No. 75J56 (Dist. Ct.
N.C. Aug. 31, 1978).
63. The murder occurred during an altercation between Ms. Lassiter, her mother, and the
victim. Apparently, Ms. Lassiter stabbed the victim seven times with a butcher knife. 101 S.
Ct. at 2156 n.l.
64. Id. at 2157. The prison visit occurred in December, 1977. In April, 1978, Lassiter
received a copy of the termination petition, and on August 11, 1978, a notice of the hearing to
be held 20 days later. Trial Transcript at 3. North Carolina now statutorily provides for the
appointment of counsel to indigent parents facing custody hearings. N.C. GEN. STAT., § 7A-587
(Supp. IB 1979). This statute, however, was passed after Ms. Lassiter's hearing occurred. She
had neither counsel nor the benefit of a "clear, cogent, and convincing evidentiary standard."
Lassiter, 101 S. Ct. at 2160.
65. The judge apparently initiated the discussion of counsel on his own volition. Lassiter
did not request that the court appoint her counsel. 101 S. Ct. at 2157. See also Trial Transcript
at 3 (actual discussion of trial Judge).
66. The only witnesses to testify were Ms. Lassiter's mother and a Durham County social
worker. 101 S. Ct. at 2157-58. The following excerpt from the transcript is an example of the
problem:
THE COURT: All right. Do you want to ask her [the social worker] any ques-
tions?
LASSITER
cern or responsibility" for the welfare of her son, the court terminated her
parental rights."
PETR: About what? About what she-
THE COURT: About this child.
PETR: Oh, yes.
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead.
PETR: The only thing I know is that when you say-
THE COURT: I don't want you to testify.
PETR: Okay.
THE COURT: I want to know whether you want to cross-examine her or ask any
questions.
PETR: Yes, I want to. Well, you know the only thing I know about it is my part
that I know about it. I know-
THE COURT: I am not talking about what you know. I want to know if you
want to ask her any questions or not.
PETR: About that?
THE COURT: Yes. Do you understand the nature of this proceeding?
PETR: Yes.
THE COURT: And that is to terminate any rights you have to the child and place
it for adoption, if necessary.
PETR: Yes, I know.
THE COURT: Are there any questions you want to ask her about what she has
testified to?
PETR: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead.
PETR: I want to know why you think you are going to turn my child over to a
foster home? He knows my mother and he knows all of us. He knows her and he
knows all of us.
THE COURT: Who is he?
PETR: My son, William.
Trial Transcript at 19-20, reprinted in 101 S. Ct. at 2173 n.22.
The trial transcript became part of the record on appeal only after the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. The transcript is so replete with error that the County Attorney seriously
considered confessing error when he first read it. Telephone interview with Thomas Russell
Odom, Assistant County Attorney, Durham County, North Carolina, (June 5, 1981).
67. Id. at 2158 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT., § 7A-289.32(l) (1972) (repealed 1979)). When the
Lassiter termination proceedings began, grounds for termination included: failure of parent to
maintain concern or responsibility as to the child's welfare, physical abuse or neglect, failure
of parent whose child has been in foster care for more than two years to show progress in cor-
recting conditions which led to child's removal from parent's home, and parent's failure to
contribute financially to maintenance of child in custody of the county. N.C. GEN. STAT.,
§ 7A-289.32 (Supp. IB 1979). For an examination of statutes in a number of states, see Note,
The Right to Family Integrity: A Substantive Due Process Approach to State Removal and Ter-
mination Proceedings, 68 GEO. L.J. 213, 230-35 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Family Integrity]
(recognition of right to family integrity as fundamental should result in application of strict
scrutiny analysis for state intervention).
Termination of parental rights permanently severs the parent-child relationship. As one
judge stated: "The child is dead so far as that parent is concerned." In re William L., 477 Pa.
322, 370, 383 A.2d 1228, 1252 (Maderino, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978). In
addition, the parent loses what has been described as "the security provided to a parent when
his children become adults; favorable status in a society which attaches significant cultural
value to parenthood and family life; and a right to psychologically important manifestations of
19811
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On appeal, Lassiter argued that she was entitled to appointed counsel
under the fourteenth amendment due process clause. The North Carolina
Court of Appeals rejected her argument, however, and held that the Con-
stitution did not require the appointment of counsel for indigent parents. 68
The Supreme Court of North Carolina denied Lassiter's application for
review, 69 and on October 6, 1980, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari."0
In Lassiter, the Court held that the fourteenth amendment due process
clause does not require the appointment of counsel for every indigent facing
termination of parental rights."' In so holding, the Court reasoned that
Lassiter was not entitled to appointed counsel because she had failed to ex-
press an interest in her son strong enough to rebut the presumption that an
indigent has no right to appointed counsel unless faced with deprivation of
physical liberty."3 To establish this presumption, the Lassiter Court analyzed
previous right to counsel cases. According to the Court, precedent clearly
indicated that an indigent's right to appointed counsel is "triggered" 3 by
his interest in personal freedom, not merely predicated upon the sixth and
fourteenth amendments. The Lassiter Court stated that no case established
a right to counsel in criminal prosecutions absent the threat of incarcera-
tion, and therefore, there was a presumption that due process required the
appointment of counsel only where physical liberty was at stake.74 Conse-
quently, the Court reasoned that as an indigent's interest in personal liberty
diminishes, so does his right to appointed counsel.7"
a child's natural love for his parent." Comment, supra note 45, at 635-36. Termination also
puts an end to the child's right to be supported and maintained by, as well as to inherit from,
the parent. In re K.S. & M.S., 33 Colo. App. 72, 76, 515 P.2d 130, 133 (1973).
68. In re Lassiter, 43 N.C. App. 525, 259 S.E.2d 336 (1979).
69. In re Lassiter, 299 N.C. 120, 262 S.E.2d 6 (1980).
70. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 101 S. Ct. 70 (1980).
71. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Burger and
Justices White, Powell and Rehnquist joined.
72. 101 S. Ct. at 2158.
73. Id. at 2159.
74. Id. The Lassiter Court stated that it was significant in Gideon v Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963), that the indigent defendant was sentenced to five years in prison. Accordingly, the
Court interpreted Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), as establishing that an indigent's
right to liberty, and thus appointed counsel, deserved protection regardless of the length of the
sentence or the classification of the offense. 101 S. Ct. at 2158.
The Lassiter Court relied upon In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (juveniles have a right to ap-
pointed counsel in delinquency hearings that may result in institutionalization even though
those proceedings are termed "civil" rather than "criminal"); and Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S.
480 (1980) (appointed counsel is required for indigent prisoners facing involuntary transfer to a
mental institution), for the statement that physical liberty triggers the right to counsel. 101 S.
Ct. at 2159.
75. 101 S. Ct. at 2159. The Lassiter Court stated that in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972), it had characterized a parolee's liberty as "conditional liberty." Relying on the Brewer
characterization and equating parole with probation, the Court in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. 778 (1973), found that due process does not mandate appointed counsel for indigents at
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Having established the presumption, the Court then balanced the private
interests, the state's interests, and the risk of error. Initially, the Court
acknowledged that a parent's desire for the custody, companionship, care,
and management of his or her child had been clearly established as an im-
portant interest.76 Accordingly, the Court also stated that states should
defer to parental rights and these rights must be protected "absent a power-
ful countervailing interest." 77 Finally, characterizing the termination of
parental rights as a "unique kind of deprivation," the Court concluded that
parents share with the state a commanding interest in an accurate and just
termination decision."
Evaluating the state's interests, the Court recognized that the state may
also share the parent's interest in the availability of appointed counsel. This
is true because an adversary system presumes that an accurate decision most
likely occurs through the contest of opposing interests.79 Additionally, the
state may have an interest in avoiding the expense of appointed counsel.
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that this pecuniary interest is not strong
enough to overcome the parent's interests.8"
Finally, the Court explored the risk that uncounselled parents could have
their parental rights erroneously terminated. Acknowledging that termina-
tion proceedings sometimes involve difficult points of law, and that un-
educated indigents are often ill-equipped to understand the expert medical
and psychiatric testimony that might be introduced, the Court concluded
that there was an appreciable risk of error.8' In addition, the Court
recognized that lower courts have generally required the appointment of
counsel for indigent parents at termination proceedings. 2
parole revocation hearings. Because the liberty at stake is conditional rather than absolute, ap-
pointment of counsel is to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
76. 101 S. Ct. at 2160. The Court stated that past decisions have established this interest
"beyond the need for multiple citation." Id. For the argument that recognition of these par-
ental rights suggests the existence of a fundmental right to family integrity, see Family Integri-
ty, supra note 67, at 215-23.
77. 101 S. Ct. at 2161.
78. Id. at 2160.
79. The Court pointed out that without the assistance of counsel for the parent, the contest
of interests may be "unwholesomely unequal." Id. at 2160. See note 120 infra.
80. 101 S. Ct. at 2160. The Court stated that this is particularly true because the cost of
appointed counsel is "de minimus" compared to the costs in criminal actions. Id. (quoting
Brief for Respondent at 43, Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 101 S. Ct. 2153 (1981)).
81. Id. at 2161. The Court feared that parents thrust into a distressing and disorienting
situation at the hearing may be overwhelmed without the aid of counsel.
82. Id. at 2161. See, e.g., Danforth v. Maine Dep't of Health and Welfare, 303 A.2d 794
(Me. 1973); Department of Pub. Welfare v. J.K.B., 393 N.E.2d 406 (Mass. 1976); Crist v.
Division of Youth and Family Servs., 128 N.J. Super. 402, 320 A.2d 203 (1974), modified on
other grounds, 135 N.J. Super. 573, 343 A.2d 815 (1975); State ex rel Heller, 61 Ohio St. 2d 6,
399 N.E.2d 66 (1980); In re Chads, 580 P.2d 983 (Okla. 1978); In re Myricks, 85 Wash. 2d
252, 533 P.2d 841 (1975). Additionally, the Lassiter Court noted that 33 states and the District
of Columbia statutorily provide for the appointment of Counsel at termination proceedings.
101 S. Ct. at 2163.
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After establishing the presumption that counsel need be appointed only
when physical liberty is at stake and balancing the traditional due process
interests, the Court considered whether the outcome of the interest balanc-
ing was sufficient to rebut the physical liberty presumption. The Court
hypothesized that if the parent's interests were at their strongest, the state's
interests were at their weakest, and the risks of error were at their peak, the
presumption would be overcome and due process would require the ap-
pointment of counsel. 3 The Court concluded, however, that the Constitu-
tion did not require the appointment of counsel in every termination pro-
ceeding."' Reviewing the facts at bar, the Court emphasized that the ter-
mination petition contained no allegations of neglect or abuse upon which
criminal charges could be based, no expert witnesses testified, and no
specially troublesome points of law were introduced. Consequently, the
Lassiter Court held that the failure to appoint counsel for Lassiter did not
deprive her of due process because the evidence against her was such that
the presence of counsel could not have made a determinative difference. 5
CRITICISM AND IMPACT
In Lassiter, the Court limited the scope of the fourteenth amendment
right to appointed counsel by injecting a rebuttable presumption into tradi-
tional due process interest balancing. 6 Careful analysis of previous right to
83. 101 S. Ct. at 2162,
84. The Lassiter Court adopted the standard set forth in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778
(1973), a probation revocation case, that "due process is not so rigid as to require that the
significant interests in informality, flexibility and economy must always be sacrificed ... " 101
S. Ct. at 2162 (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788 (1973)).
85. 101 S. Ct. at 2162. Justice Blackmun wrote a lengthy dissent, in which he was joined
by Justices Brennan and Marshall. At the outset, he stated that the extent of due process re-
quired depends upon the interests at stake and the nature of the governmental proceedings. Id.
at 2164. When the state seeks to curtail fundamental liberty interests by a formal adversarial
proceeding, appointed counsel may be required for fairness. The dissent maintained that due
process requires the appointment of counsel in a parental rights termination hearing, because
the private interest is compelling, the state's role is adversarial, and the state's interest is
minimal. Id. at 2165. A presumption that physical liberty alone triggers the right to counsel is
not supported by precedent. See notes 87-111 and accompanying text infra. Further, the dissent
asserted that the majority opinion misrepresented the Court's flexible approach to due process.
101 S. Ct. at 2167. The flexibility of due process does not involve case-by-case consideration of
different litigants within a given context. Id. at 2172. Instead, due process analysis examines
decision-making contexts and addresses the interests involved generally to formulate a general
rule applicable to all cases arising within that particular context. Id. at 2171. Thus, an ad hoc
approach to parental entitlement to counsel is cumbersome, costly, and inadequate to ensure
fairness. Additionally, such an approach promotes increased federal interference in state pro-
ceee.ings. Id. at 2164-65.
In the instant case, the dissenters reasoned, Ms. Lassiter was deprived of a fundamental
liberty interest without due process of law because in the absence of counsel, she was not given
a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Id. at 2163-76.
86. In no other case has the Supreme Court initiated its analysis of due process with a
"presumption" drawn from prior case law. For example, in Little v. Streater, 101 S. Ct. 2202
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appointed counsel case law, however, does not support the presumption
that only potential deprivation of physical liberty triggers the right to
counsel. A more accurate interpretation of precedent compels the conclu-
sion that when the state seeks to infringe upon any fundamental liberty in-
terest through a formal adversary proceeding, due process requires the ap-
pointment of counsel.87 Additionally, introduction of the presumption alters
the primary focus evident in traditional due process analysis. After Lassiter,
the indigent's right to counsel must be determined on a case-by-case basis.
This approach is a retrenchment of the ad hoc decision-making mandated
by Betts v. Brady and is likely to cause a resurgence of problems similar to
those experienced by the courts following Betts."
This retrenchment is due in large part to the Lassiter Court's misunder-
standing of right to counsel precedent. The Lassiter Court's interpretation
of Gideon accorded great significance to the fact that the defendant in
Gideon was sentenced to prison. It was not the particular circumstances of
that case, however, that led the Gideon Court to overrule Betts v. Brady.
Factually, Gideon and Betts were almost indistinguishable." Crucial to
Gideon was the Supreme Court's realization that counsel was indispensible
to a fair criminal trial, regardless of the specific facts or potential punish-
ment.'0 A more faithful reading of Gideon leads to the conclusion that the
need for adequate representation, not the possibility of incarceration, makes
court appointment of counsel essential to a fair trial.'
Similarly, in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 2 it was the indigent's need for
representation that led the Court to mandate a right to counsel in nonfelony
prosecutions. Argersinger specifically focused upon the fact that the need
for counsel was not dependent upon the classification of the offense. 3 The
Lassiter Court, however, maintained that the central premise of Argersinger
was that "actual imprisonment [was] a penalty different in kind from fines
or the mere threat of imprisonment,"'" and thus interpreted the Court's
holding to be that the potential for incarceration triggered the right to
counsel.' Contrary to the Lassiter Court's extrapolation, Argersinger
(1981), decided the same day as Lassiter, the Court employed a traditional due process analysis
to find that a defendant to a paternity suit may not be constitutionally denied access to blood
grouping tests on the basis of indigency. Rather than formulating a rebuttable "presumption,"
the Streater Court utilized precedent only as a measure of the weight to be given certain inter-
ests in the balancing process.
87. Lassiter, 101 S. Ct. at 2164-65 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
88. See notes 119-29 and accompanying text infra.
89. See notes 22 & 30 and accompanying text supra.
90. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).'
91. Id. at 339.
92. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
93. Id. at 30-37. The Argersinger Court's emphasis on the effect of imprisonment upon an
individual's career or reputation is an indication that there are interests other than physical
liberty that call for the assistance of appointed counsel. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
94. 101 S. Ct. at 2159 (quoting Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979).
95. See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
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recognized that to deprive an individual of physical liberty was to deprive
that person of a fundamental right, regardless of the length of the depriva-
tion. 6 Furthermore, the Argersinger Court reasoned that a litigant's need
for the assistance of counsel was not determined by the length of his or her
prison sentence, or whether the proceeding was criminal or civil.9"
The Lassiter Court also relied on In re Gault98 for the proposition that
the right to personal freedom, not the sixth or fourteenth amendments, trig-
gered the right to counsel."' This reliance was misplaced, however. While
the Gault Court emphasized the possibility of incarceration to some extent,
the central premise of Gault was that due process may require court ap-
pointed counsel in civil proceedings. 00 Significantly, the Supreme Court
previously refused to mandate a right to appointed counsel triggered by the
loss of physical liberty in a case similiar to Gault. In Parham v. J.R.,'°' the
petitioner was a juvenile facing commitment in a mental institution. The
Parham Court acknowledged the child's interest in his physical liberty, but
determined that the introduction of counsel would unnecessarily transform
the commitment hearing from an essentially medical and informational pro-
ceeding into an adversarial contest.' 2
For similar reasons, the Court in Gagnon v. Scarpelli,"°" found that no
constitutional right to counsel existed at informal probation revocation
hearings. The Lassiter Court explained that in Gagnon, "conditional"
rather than "absolute" liberty was at stake in a probation revocation hear-
ing. ' " As the litigant's interest in personal liberty diminished, the Lassiter
Court concluded, so did his right to appointed counsel. The nature of the
litigant's physical liberty interest, however, was not the sole reason that the
96. It is impossible to reconcile drawing a line between confinement and nonconfinement
with the equal protection concept of Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971). In Mayer,
the litigant was convicted of a minor offense, punishable by fine only. The Supreme Court
unanimously held that the litigant could not be denied a free transcript for purposes of appeal
simply because he was not sentenced to incarceration. Id. at 196-97.
97. After the Court in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), held that the right to
counsel originates in the fourteenth as well as the sixth amendment, subsequent determination
of that right depended on what was fundamentally fair. See note 16 and accompanying text
supra. In Gideon and Argersinger, the right to counsel continued to depend on the fair trial
guarantee of the fourteenth amendment. See note 39 and accompanying text supra. Further,
the Argersinger Court relied on In re Gault for its statement that "in prosecutions for offenses
less serious than felonies, a fair trial may require the presence of a lawyer." Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34 (1972).
98. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
99. 101 S. Ct. at 2159. See note 76 supra.
100. See notes 42-45 and accompanying text supra.
101. 422 U.S. 584 (1979).
102. Id. at 604-10. The only real distinction between Gault and Parham is the nature of the
proceeding involved. In both cases the right at stake was the individual's interest in personal
freedom, yet counsel was found to be an essential procedural safeguard only when the pro-
ceeding was a formal adversarial contest. 101 S. Ct. at 2164-65 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
103. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
104. 101 S. Ct. at 2159.
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Gagnon Court refused to require the appointment of counsel. More impor-
tant in Gagnon was the nature of the probation revocation hearing.'"5 Ac-
cording to the Gagnon Court, the function of the probation officer was
rehabilitative rather than punitive, and introduction of counsel into the
revocation proceedings would unnecessarily alter the nature of the pro-
ceedings. Accordingly, the Court concluded that counsel was not required
in every case because the hearing was informal and nonadversarial.' °6
The distinction drawn by the Lassiter Court between "conditional" and
"absolute" liberty as it affects the right to counsel is also inconsistent with
Vitek v. Jones."7 In Vitek, the Court mandated the appointment of counsel
for prison inmates being transferred to state mental hospitals.' 8 The
105. 411 U.S. at 787. Gagnon addressed two issues: first, whether due process mandated
preliminary and final revocation hearings; and second, whether due process required the ap-
pointment of counsel to probationers or parolees facing revocation. It was in its discussion of.
the first issue that the Gagnon Court considered the "conditional" nature of the liberty inter-
est at stake. In its analysis of the second issue; the Court did not directly mention conditional
physical liberty. Rather, the Court stated that the probationer's right to due process was
limited because he had been convicted of a crime. Id. at 789. In addition, the Court discussed
the rehabilitative role of the probation/parole officer, the great discretion he or she is accorded,
and the informality of the proceedings. Id. at 784.
106. Id. at 789. The Lassiter Court adopted its case-by-case approach, in part, from
Gagnon. The Gagnon Court's ad hoc decision-making, however, is inappropriate when, as in
Lassiter, the state seeks to abridge a fundamental interest. See note 112 infra. In Gagnon, the
Court recognized that Gideon rejected the case-by-case approach of Betts. 411 U.S. at 788.
The Gagnon Court concluded, however, that such an approach was adequate to protect the
limited due process rights of an indigent probationer in an informal nonadversarial revocation
hearing. Id. at 789-90. The Court stressed that in a probation revocation hearing, the state is
represented by a probation officer whose function is essentially rehabilitative and the rules of
evidence are not in effect. Id. at 789. As a result, the need for counsel is limited.
A parental rights termination proceeding, on the other hand, is a formal adversarial hearing
at which the state is represented by an experienced prosecutor, and the rules of evidence and
procedure are employed. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT., art. 24B § 7A-289.30 (Supp. IB 1979).
See also Catz & Kuelbs, The Requirement of Appointment of Counsel for Indigent Parents in
Neglect or Termination Proceedings: A Developing Area, 13 J. FAM. L. 223, 229-30 n.18
(1973-74) (appointed counsel a necessity in proceedings to terminate parental rights under both
due process and equal protection clauses of fourteenth amendment). The need for counsel is
greater because most parents faced with termination are uneducated and ill-equipped to cope
with the hearing. See note 81 supra. Further, in a parental rights termination proceeding, as
the Lassiter Court acknowledged, 101 S. Ct. at 2160, the state's pecuniary interest in avoiding
the mandatory appointment of counsel does not outweigh parents' fundamental interests in
their children. See note 80 and accompanying text supra.
Significantly, Lassiter is also distinguishable from Gagnon based upon the nature of the in-
terest at stake in each case. In Gagnon, the Court emphasized that the due process right of a
probationer is limited because he or she has been convicted of a crime. 411 U.S. at 789. While
a probationer may be entitled to a lesser degree of protection because of his or her limited
rights, a parent is not. As the Lassiter Court admitted, parental rights are compelling and
deserving of great protection and deference. 101 S. Ct. at 2160.
107. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
108. Vitek was a plurality decision in which Justice Powell concurred in part. Although
Justice Powell agreed that an indigent prisoner facing commitment must receive qualified and
independent legal assistance, he expressed his opinion that it need not be by a licensed at-
torney. Id. at 500.
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Lassiter Court cited Vitek in support of its claim that the deprivation of
physical liberty triggered the right to counsel. °9 Yet, in Vitek, the in-
carcerated litigant stood to lose no more than "conditional" liberty as the
Lassiter Court would define it. A more accurate basis for the holding in
Vitek was the Court's recognition of the stigma that accompanies commit-
ment to a mental institution as well as the inability of diseased or defective
individuals to represent themselves.' 0 It was the prisoner's need for counsel
that triggered the right in Vitek, not the loss of physical liberty as the
Lassiter Court asserted."'
Thus, examination of right to counsel case law indicates that the due pro-
cess guarantee of a fair hearing requires the appointment of counsel when
the government seeks to deprive an individual of a fundamental liberty in-
terest through a formal adversary proceeding." In cases in which the liber-
109. 101 S. Ct. at 2159.
110. The Vitek Court stated:
The loss of liberty produced by an involuntary commitment is more than a loss of
freedom from confinement . . . . [Clommitment to a mental hospital "can
engender adverse social consequences to the individual.... "Wihether we label
this phenomena "stigma" or choose to call it something else . . .it can occur and
it can have a very significant impact on the individual.
445 U.S. at 492 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979)).
111. 101 S. Ct. at 2167 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). No new incarceration was threatened by
the transfer in Vitek. Instead, the liberty interests implicated in Vitek were the prisoner's in-
terest in his reputation and in not being subject to behavior modification while institutionalized.
Because the prisoner could not adequately represent himself, fundamental fairness required
counsel.
112. The Supreme Court has interpreted the term "liberty" as used in the fourteenth
amendment as:
[Nlot merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God ac-
cording to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). The fundamental nature of a parent's liberty in-
terest in his children has been well established in a series of Supreme Court decisions. In one
line of cases the Court limited the states' power to restrict parental decision-making when it in-
validated state statutes forbidding foreign language instruction to school children in Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); banning private school attendance in Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925); and requiring mandatory school enrollment beyond the eighth grade in
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In a second line of cases, the Court further defined
the right of parents to the care and custody of their children. For example, in May v. Ander-
son, 345 U.S. 528 (1953), the Court accorded procedural protections to a mother's right to her
children. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965), established that procedural safeguards
were required even by the inchoate custodial rights of a divorced father. In Glona v. American
Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968), the Court found that the state cannot legally
define family as excluding a biological, but unwed, mother and her children. Similarly, the
Court in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), stated that an unwed father could assert both
his and his children's rights to family integrity. A parent's right to maintain his parental status
may be construed as a fundamental right based upon the foregoing cases. The Lassiter deci-
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ty interest is less than fundamental, or the hearing is informal, the Supreme
Court has refused to find the appointment of counsel constitutionally man-
dated.
Introduction of the Lassiter presumption into traditional due process
analysis significantly alters the focus of fourteenth amendment right to
counsel adjudication. ' 3 Due process analysis has traditionally involved ex-
amination of the nature of the interests and the risk of error within the con-
text of specific rights."' The Lassiter approach, however, requires evalua-
tion of the particular interests of a specific individual on each occasion they
arise to determine whether those interests rebut the presumption drawn
from prior case law.'"
When a specific individual's interests will rebut the presumption is not
clear from the Lassiter decision. The only guidelines the decision provides
to lower courts emerge from the Lassiter Court's reference to the absence
of expert testimony, particularly troublesome points of law, and allegations
upon which criminal charges can be based." 6 These guidelines lend
sion, in effect, establishes that physical liberty is "more" fundamental than other liberty inter-
ests. Yet, it is no less than absurd to pretend that a few months of imprisonment is a depriva-
tion more grievous than the permanent loss of one's child. See 101 S. Ct. at 2176 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). See also The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 95 HARV. L. REV. 138 n. 58 (1981)
(Lassiter rationale lends artificial weight to distinction between parental rights and imprison-
ment).
In Santosky v. Kramer, 1-U.S., 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1394 (1982), the Court discussed
Lassiter and acknowledged its own "historical recognition that freedom of choice in matters of
family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the fourteenth amendment." Id. at
4335. Significantly, Justice Blackmun, author of the dissent in Lassiter, wrote the majority
opinion in Santosky. See note 85 supra.
113. See 101 S. Ct. at 2167 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
114. E.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976) (court must look to nature of interest at
stake, not its specific weight); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976) ("procedural due
process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to
the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions").
115. In its consideration of the facts, the Lassiter Court stated that the appointment of
counsel would not have changed the outcome of the case, and that, therefore, the proceedings
were fundamentally fair. 101 S. Ct. at 2162. The fourteenth amendment due process clause,
however, requires that an individual whom the government seeks to deprive of a fundamental
interest in life, liberty, or property must first be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be
heard. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914). The function of appointing counsel is to
ensure that the hearing is meaningful and thus fair. That the presence of counsel might not
have changed the outcome in Lassiter is not constitutionally relevant. Cf. Coe v. Armour Fer-
tilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 424 (1915) ("To one who protests against the taking of his prop-
erty without due process of law, it is no answer to say that in his particular case due process of
law would have led to the same result because he had no adequate defense on the merits.").
What is relevant is that counsel would have ensured that the termination proceeding was fair
for the purposes of the fourteenth amendment. Cf. Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 682 (1948)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) ("the need for counsel . . . is not determined by the complexities of
the individual case or the ability of the particular person who stands as an accused before the
court.").
116. See text accompanying notes 84 and 85 supra.
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themselves to ambiguous and subjective application. ' 7 Moreover, Lassiter
failed to delineate standards with respect to the weight or importance to be
assigned each of the stated factors. One court may consider counsel as re-
quisite in cases in which expert testimony is introduced. Another court may
interpret Lassiter to require counsel only when expert testimony,
troublesome points of law and allegations of criminality are all present.
In Betts v. Brady, the Court provided similarly vague direction for ap-
plication of the special circumstances rule. Although subsequent decisions
attempted clarification, lower courts as well as the Supreme Court applied
the rule inconsistently due to its subjective and ambiguous nature.' 8 The
Lassiter rule is, in effect, no different from the Betts special circumstances
rule.' " Consequently, application of the Lassiter rule is likely to result in
the same confusion that surrounded the special circumstances rule.
Similar to the special circumstances rule, Lassiter requires that the trial
court determine whether the assistance of counsel is necessary prior to the
trial. Although it is unlikely that a trial court will be able to accurately
predict the course of the litigation and the indigent's response to potential
difficulties, the court must attempt to do so. By inquiring into and making
judgments about a case at the outset, however, it becomes impossible for
the court to remain the impartial tribunal anticipated by our legal system.' 20
117. The Lassiter rule may actually increase the resources already marshalled against the
parent by the state. In addition to having an experienced prosecutor, a department of social
services to aid in discovery, and access to social workers' records and testimony, the state can
now influence the appointment of counsel in specific termination proceedings. The only ele-
ment of the Lassiter guidelines that is not directly under government control is the presence of
"especially troublesome points of law." 101 S. Ct. at 2162. Uncounselled parents, to whom
the simplest concepts of the law may seem incomprehensible, are unlikely to succeed in
isolating or proving legal complexities. Therefore, by opting to forego expert testimony and
omitting allegations upon which criminal charges could be based from the petition, the state
may be able to ensure the nonappointment of counsel. Cf. Catz & Kuelbs, The Requirement of
Appointment of Counsel for Indigent Parents in Neglect or Termination Proceedings: A
Developing Area, 13 J. FAM. L. 223, 229-30 n.8 (1973-74).
118. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
119. See note 28 supra.
120. L. HERMAN, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MISDEMEANOR COURT 6 (1973). A determina-
tion of what the "truth" is in a particular situation may be difficult for the court to make.
Yet, since truth is necessary for justice, courts must seek to ascertain the truth as nearly as
possible. Our adversary system is based upon the belief that a contest of opposing interests
with a judge or jury sitting as arbitrator, will be most likely to reveal the truth. Although abso-
lute equality in skill of the contending interests is not possible, the contest cannot approach
equality without counsel for one side. Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM.
L. REV. 1322, 1331 (1961). When the indigent litigant is unrepresented by counsel it becomes
the duty of the judge to see that his rights are not violated.
In an empirical study, New York Family Court judges were asked about the effects of
parents being unrepresented in neglect cases. The results indicated that 72.2%7' found that lack
of representation made it more difficult to conduct a fair hearing. More specifically, 66.7070
found it more difficult to develop the facts. Representation in Child-Neglect Cases: Are
Parents Neglected?, 4 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROB. 230, 253 (1968). The lack of counsel for in-
digents in termination proceedings is thus burdensome for the judge as well as the indigents.
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Moreover, because the right to counsel is derived from the sixth and
fourteenth amendments, state law adjudication of that right is subject to
federal court review. After Betts, there was a great increase in the number
of state convicts who appealed their convictions to federal courts.' 2' Federal
judges were consequently obliged to extensively examine state decisions to
determine whether state courts erroneously denied the assistance of
counsel.'2 2 As a result, state judges were sometimes admonished that they
had misapplied their own state law'23 or that they had failed to properly
protect the defendant. 24 The friction that resulted was substantial. After
Lassiter, indigent parents denied the assistance of appointed counsel in state
courts may similarly appeal to federal courts. The increased federal supervi-
sion that will necessarily result may produce friction analogous to that
which occurred in the aftermath of Betts.
Another risk of the Betts special circumstances rule was the unjust in-
carceration of individuals forced to await appeal. One convict spent nine-
teen years at hard labor before the Supreme Court ruled that he had been
denied his constitutional right to counsel under Betts. "'25 Due to the length
of time generally necessary to perfect an appeal, uncounselled parents may,
after Lassiter, be unfairly deprived of the care and custody of their children
for several years. Additionally, children may be forced to await resolution
of the appeal in a foster home or child care institution, forbidden to return
home, and ineligible for adoption.' 26 The effect of this uncertainty and in-
stability can be emotionally disastrous for children.' 27
Potential for a fair determination on appeal is also diminished by
Lassiter. While review of the pleadings and transcripts may uncover the
121. BEANEY, supra note 1, at 196. For a discussion of the problems facing a judge trying to
apply the "special circumstances" rule, see Potter v. Dowd, 146 F.2d 244, 248-50 (7th Cir.
1944) (Evans, J., concurring).
122. See Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The Art of Overruling, 1963 Sup. Cr. REV. 211, 265
(1963).
123. E.g., McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109, 116 (1961) (Supreme Court stated it was ques-
tionable whether the crime for which accused was convicted actually existed under Florida
law).
124. E.g., Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 776-78 (1949) (state court judge found to have
violated the accused's constitutional rights and "evinced a hostile and thoroughly unjudicial at-
titude"). The difficulties experienced by judges applying the "special circumstances" rule are
illustrated by one state supreme court justice in an article suggesting ways to ensure that an ac-
cused's rights are not violated. Sloan, The Jail House Lawyer Versus Court and Counsel:
Some Ideas for Self-Protection, 1 Washburn L.J. 517 (1962).
125. Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957) (accused sentenced to solitary confinement at
hard labor in 1938, and in 1957 Supreme Court ruled he had been denied constitutional right
to counsel). Accord, DeMeerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947) (15 years elapsed between
trial and reversal for lack of counsel); Garton v. Tinsley, 171 F. Supp. 387 (D. Colo. 1959) (14
years elapsed prior to grant of writ of habeas corpus).
126. For a discussion of the problems with foster care, see Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families for Equity & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
127. Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's Role in
Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887 (1975).
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glaring errors and omissions of the uncounselled parent, the true
significance of the lack of legal assistance may not be readily apparent from
the record. '28 Illogically, Lassiter puts the burden of showing the need for
counsel on the unrepresented parents, just as Betts did on uncounselled con-
victs. It is unreasonable to expect indigent parents who are generally
uneducated to have the knowledge and skill necessary to garner essential
facts and preserve them on the record. Faced with the prospect of losing
their children, many parents become unable to function even at normal
capacity,' 29 yet Lassiter expects them to summon the requisite legal exper-
tise. Ironically, the more the parent needs counsel, the less likely he will be
able to prove that need to the court.
CONCLUSION
Since the Supreme Court has tied the right to appointed counsel to the
fourteenth amendment's guarantee of a fair hearing, an indigent's right to
counsel has become largely a due process question. In Lassiter, the Supreme
Court introduced a new element into traditional due process analysis. Ac-
cording to the Court, previous right to counsel cases established the
presumption that an indigent has a right to counsel only when he may be
deprived of his physical liberty. This presumption, however, is unsupported
by precedent. A more accurate reading of precedent would establish a right
to appointed counsel in cases in which the government deprives an indigent
of a fundamental interest through a formal adversary proceeding.
Lassiter indicates that the Court is reluctant to expand the indigent's right
to counsel. By introducing a new element into the traditional due process
analysis, the Supreme Court changed the focus of fourteenth amendment
128. As one justice has so eloquently stated:
Truth does not always stalk boldly forth naked, but modest withal, in a printed
abstract in a court of last resort. She oft hides in nooks and crannies visible only
to the mind's eye of the judge who tries the case. To him appears the furtive
glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or
sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it,
the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien.
The brazen face of the liar, the glibness of the schooled witness in reciting a lesson
or the itching over-eagerness of the swift witness, as well as honest face of the
truthful one, are alone seen by him. In short, one witness may give testimony that
reads in print, here, as if falling from the lips of an angel of light and yet not a
soul who heard it, nisi, believed a word of it; and another witness may testify so
that it reads brokenly and obscurely in print and yet there was that about the
witness that carried conviction of truth to every soul who heard him testify.
Creamer v. Bivert, 214 Mo. 473, 479-80, 113 S.W. 1188, 1120-21 (1908).
129. In Lassiter, Ms. Lassiter found it so difficult to comprehend that her child could be
taken away from her that she refused to attend the custody hearing. At trial she explained her
absence as follows: "He [a county social worker] asked me ... could I get up there because I
didn't know what was happening. And I told him . . . I ain't going-I just said I'm going to
Court about my own child? . . . I was just shocked and I didn't know what was going on."
Trial Transcript at 32, In re Lassiter, No. 75J56 (Dist. Ct. N.C. Aug. 31, 1978).
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right to counsel adjudication. As a consequence of the Lassiter presump-
tion, the indigent's right to counsel must be decided on a case-by-case basis.
This ad hoc approach, together with the Lassiter Court's failure to provide
clear guidelines for its application, appears to be a return to the prob-
lematic special circumstances rule of Betts v. Brady. As a result, the prob-
lems created by Lassiter are likely to be much like those encountered in the
aftermath of Betts.
Julie P. Shelton

